

Q6: Now let's move this conversation from threat assessment to damage assessment. My request here is that you provide a thorough list of the changes to the operations and services of the U.S. Federal Government that have arisen from the right-wing influences that we have been discussing. By "thorough" in the previous sentence I'm asking that you not leave out major types of change, but not necessarily that you go into great detail for any specific type of change. Also, do not be limited by geographical boundaries; I am interested in both international and domestic changes.

Please provide URLs for each assertion you make so I can do my own research to verify assertions and pursue details.

If you can provide qualitative or brief quantitative descriptions of the nature and extent of damages, that would be helpful, but my primary objective is near-complete coverage of the *types* of damage/change. Examples of types of change I would like to see listed: Cancellation by DOGE and others of USAID benefits and other foreign aid; Impact on the world economy arising from the war with Iran; Impact on geopolitics, with specific attention to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Russia-NATO relationship, and realignment of East-West power relationships; crippling of domestic services such as FEMA and NOAA; compromise of Constitutionally protected rights such as free speech, voting, due process, and others due to executive orders and other extra-legal actions, particularly including ICE and other parts of the Department of Homeland Security; crippling of services due to loss of "institutional memory" throughout the Executive due to purging of employees; change in functions and policies of the Department of Justice and related organizations, such as the FBI, and their general effects of law enforcement; disruption of communities due to mass

deportations; and changes to legal precedents due to a campaign of strategic court filings.

I have a purpose behind this question that I would like you to take into account as you build your answers: I want to design a mitigation and remediation strategy that, if possible, employs an understanding of Shared-Edge Unification in order to weaken low-order organizational bonds and reduce the overall damages that have arisen from the interconnections that have been built. So please look for those interconnections and identify them.

A6: Yes. I think the most useful way to answer this is to treat **“damage” as loss or transformation of governmental capability**, rather than only as harm to individuals. That gives us a taxonomy that can later be mapped onto your Shared-Edge Unification model.

I also want to make one methodological distinction. I am using *right-wing influences* to mean the policy/intellectual network we have been discussing—Project 2025, Heritage and allied organizations, Christian-nationalist and immigration restrictionist movements, anti-administrative-state legal theory, MAGA, and the technological/financial currents we have been examining. I am **not** claiming that every action below was caused by every one of those groups, nor that every consequence was intended. Some are explicit ideological objectives; others are consequences of implementation, institutional disruption, or interaction effects.

The resulting picture is considerably broader than “government services were cut.”

A damage map of the federal government, 2025–September 2026

Executive summary

I find at least 20 major classes of change/damage:

- 1. Destruction/reduction of federal administrative capacity**
- 2. Loss of institutional memory and professional expertise**
- 3. Dismantling/reconfiguration of independent regulatory agencies**
- 4. Immigration enforcement, detention and deportation**
- 5. Erosion of immigration due process and legal safeguards**
- 6. Expansion of executive control over elections**
- 7. Reduction of federal election-security and voting-rights functions**
- 8. Transformation of DOJ/FBI law-enforcement priorities**
- 9. Retrenchment of federal civil-rights enforcement**
- 10. Expansion of presidential control over the administrative state**
- 11. Environmental and climate-policy reversal**
- 12. Disruption of federal scientific research and public-health infrastructure**
- 13. Reduction of disaster, weather and environmental-information capacity**
- 14. Reduction/reconfiguration of social-service delivery**
- 15. Education and student-aid disruption**

16. **Tax administration and fiscal-capacity degradation**
17. **Foreign-aid and international-development system dismantling**
18. **Transformation of U.S. foreign policy, alliances and geopolitical position**
19. **Military/defense transformation and the Iran war**
20. **Privatization/datafication of governmental functions and weakening of oversight**

There is also a **cross-cutting 21st category** that I think is especially important for your project:

21. **The transformation of the interfaces among government, private capital, private technology, political organizations and civil society.**

That last category is where I think the Shared-Edge model becomes particularly powerful.

1. Federal administrative capacity has been deliberately reduced

This is the most pervasive change.

Across 22 major federal agencies, GAO found that nearly **378,000 employees separated during 2025**, while about 127,000 were hired. The resulting workforce was approximately **256,000 smaller—more**

than 11%—by January 2026. Most agencies experienced reductions exceeding 10%, and some exceeded 30%. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

The mechanism included deferred-resignation programs, early retirement, reductions in force, probationary dismissals and hiring restrictions. GAO found that probationary employees were separated at higher rates than other employees at most of the health- and safety-related agencies it examined. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — Federal Agency Workforce Changes](#)

[GAO — Probationary Employment and Workforce Reductions](#)

Damage

The important damage isn't simply “fewer employees.”

It is:

less capacity to execute laws → less capacity to regulate → less capacity to inspect → less capacity to enforce → less capacity to collect information → less capacity to respond to crises.

That is effectively a reduction in the *state's computational and organizational bandwidth*.

Shared edges

This connects directly to:

DOGE → workforce reduction → agencies → contractors/private providers

and therefore potentially to the Technological Sovereignist phenomenon we've been examining.

2. Institutional memory and professional expertise have been damaged

This is distinct from headcount.

OPM lost **35% of its staff between December 2024 and March 2026**, and **57% of departing employees had at least 11 years of service**. GAO specifically identifies this as a loss of institutional knowledge and operational capacity. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

FEMA is an even more striking example: more than **4,300 employees—about 17% of its workforce—left in FY2025**, a 55% increase over the prior year. FEMA officials reported loss of leadership and institutional knowledge. Fifty-eight Senior Executive Service employees left between January 2025 and January 2026, compared with fewer than 13 per year on average during the preceding three fiscal years. ([GAO Files](#))

At the SEC, 33 of 61 employees interviewed by GAO said departing employees had unique knowledge or subject-matter expertise. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

DOD lost more than **78,000 civilian employees—about 10%—in 2025**, without consistently analyzing the operational consequences.

([Government Accountability Office](#))

NASA lost about **4,000 civil servants, nearly 22% of its workforce**, in 2025; 25 of 36 major projects subsequently reported effects from the reductions. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — OPM institutional knowledge](#)

[GAO — FEMA workforce and mission readiness](#)

[GAO — SEC workforce reductions](#)

[GAO — DOD civilian workforce](#)

[GAO — NASA workforce reductions](#)

Damage

This may be one of the hardest damages to repair.

Personnel can be rehired relatively quickly. **Institutional memory cannot.**

The damage includes loss of:

- tacit knowledge;
- professional networks;
- historical understanding of programs;
- knowledge of contractors;
- knowledge of failure modes;
- regulatory expertise;
- succession pipelines;

- informal coordination mechanisms.

This is a **state-capacity degradation mechanism** in its purest form.

3. FEMA's disaster-response capacity has been degraded

GAO's August 2026 assessment is unusually direct: FEMA's workforce reductions were not based on strategic workforce planning and **may leave the agency unable to effectively respond to disasters now or in the future.** ([Government Accountability Office](#))

The agency also rescinded its strategic plan in 2025.

[GAO — FEMA Workforce: Staff Reductions and Lack of Planning May Impact Mission Readiness](#)

Damage

The damage is not merely reduced federal employment. It is diminished:

pre-disaster planning → disaster response → recovery → institutional learning.

And because disasters are increasing in frequency and complexity, the reduction occurs precisely where organizational redundancy is valuable.

Shared edge

DOGE/workforce ideology → FEMA staffing → disaster response → state/local governments → private contractors.

This is an important example of a *local organizational intervention propagating through a much larger network.*

4. NOAA and environmental-information capacity have been weakened

The NOAA Science Advisory Board's 2026 report describes an agency undergoing rapid change while supplying the observations, forecasts and warnings on which public safety and economic activity depend. It reports a reduced workforce, personnel taking on double or triple responsibilities, and a reduced or delayed scientific research budget. ([NOAA Institutional Repository](#))

[NOAA Science Advisory Board — 2026 Report to Congress](#)

Damage

Potential consequences include degradation of:

- hurricane forecasting;
- severe-weather warning;
- ocean monitoring;
- climate data;

- fisheries management;
- satellite-derived information;
- emergency planning;
- commercial weather information.

This is particularly significant because NOAA produces **public information infrastructure** that private markets cannot completely reproduce.

5. Immigration enforcement has been transformed from a specialized function into a dominant federal operational priority

ICE has substantially expanded enforcement and detention capacity since January 2025. GAO reports that ICE and the Army opened Camp East Montana rapidly, with contractual arrangements requiring payment for services for **5,000 detainees even when the facility held only about 1,600** in February 2026. GAO found millions of dollars of waste and deficiencies in detention standards. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — Immigration Detention: Camp East Montana](#)

The broader social effect is substantial. The Urban Institute found that in 2025 both immigrant and nonimmigrant families reported immigration enforcement activity in their communities, fear of

encountering ICE, and knowing people who had been detained. ([Urban Institute](#))

Immigrant families also reported withdrawing from public life and avoiding essential services and safety-net programs. ([Urban Institute](#))

[Urban Institute — Immigration enforcement and families](#)

[Urban Institute — Disengagement from public life and services](#)

Damage

The important system-level effect is:

immigration enforcement → fear → withdrawal from institutions → reduced use of schools/health care/social programs → community disruption → economic effects.

This is much larger than the number of deportations.

6. Immigration detention oversight has simultaneously been weakened

This is one of the clearest examples of **coupled expansion of one governmental function with contraction of the institutions that constrain it.**

DHS issued RIF notices to most employees of:

- the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties;
- the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman;
- the Immigration Detention Ombudsman.

GAO reports that DHS proposed eliminating 147 positions in CRCL, 118 in CISOMB and 46 in OIDO. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

GAO subsequently reported that DHS's FY2026 appropriations law eliminated OIDO even though the statutory Ombudsman position remained in law. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — DHS Civil Rights and Immigration Ombudsman reductions](#)
[GAO — Immigration Detention inspection programs](#)

Shared edge

This is a particularly revealing one:

immigration enforcement expansion ↔ oversight contraction.

That is a recurring structural pattern worth looking for elsewhere.

7. Immigration due-process protections have been put under extraordinary pressure

The Supreme Court required notice and an opportunity for judicial review for people subject to removal under the Alien Enemies Act. ([Supreme Court](#))

The administration nevertheless has pursued unusually aggressive removal mechanisms, including use of the Alien Enemies Act and other expedited procedures.

A particularly consequential current development is the first use of the long-dormant **Alien Terrorist Removal Court**, involving a lawful permanent resident deported using classified evidence and a specialized process. ([Reuters](#))

[Supreme Court — A.A.R.P. v. Trump / Alien Enemies Act](#)
[Reuters — First use of Alien Terrorist Removal Court](#)

Damage

This changes the operational relationship between:

immigration enforcement ↔ courts ↔ habeas corpus ↔ executive power.

It is therefore not simply an immigration-policy change. It is a constitutional-process change.

8. Mass immigration enforcement is disrupting communities beyond the people being deported

The Urban Institute found that immigration enforcement affected both immigrant and nonimmigrant families, with people avoiding government programs and public life because of fear. ([Urban Institute](#))

Human Rights Watch estimates that **52 people died in ICE custody between January 20, 2025 and June 4, 2026**, with the mortality rate more than twice the rate at the beginning of the second Trump administration and nearly four times the Biden-administration rate. ([Human Rights Watch](#))

[Human Rights Watch — Dying in Detention](#)

Damage

The system effect includes:

family separation + labor-market disruption + school disruption + reduced health-care utilization + community fear + detention costs + local-government burden.

That is a network effect rather than an isolated law-enforcement effect.

9. The federal government's relationship to elections has changed

The administration has attempted to exercise substantially greater federal control over election administration.

The March 2025 executive order attempted to impose new voter-registration requirements; the March 2026 order attempted to affect mail voting and ballot delivery. Courts have blocked substantial portions. ([Brennan Center for Justice](#))

The Supreme Court's August 2026 decision in *Trump v. California* concerned an executive order directing changes to mail voting and the federal government's attempted role in election administration. ([Legal Information Institute](#))

[Brennan Center — Status of Trump's anti-voting executive order](#)
[Supreme Court — Trump v. California](#)

Damage

Even where courts ultimately prevent implementation, the operational effect includes:

- state election offices having to respond to federal directives;
- litigation costs;
- uncertainty;
- changes to election planning;
- pressure on election officials;
- potential voter confusion.

This is a good example of **damage through attempted action**, not only completed policy.

10. The federal election-security apparatus has been weakened

The Brennan Center documents reductions in federal funding, coordination and technical support to state election systems. ([Brennan Center for Justice](#))

The Project 2025 agenda explicitly proposed weakening CISA, which has played a major role in election cybersecurity. ([Brennan Center for Justice](#))

[Brennan Center — Federal government and election security](#)
[Brennan Center — Project 2025 and elections](#)

Shared edge

This connects:

anti-administrative-state ideology → CISA → election security → state/local election officials.

The same network can therefore simultaneously:

increase federal political intervention in elections while reducing federal technical support for election security.

That's an important systems-level asymmetry.

11. DOJ's election function has shifted toward voter-roll enforcement and citizenship verification

The DOJ has sued states for voter rolls at an unprecedented scale. By February 2026 it reported litigation against **29 states plus the District of Columbia**. ([Department of Justice](#))

The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the Civil Rights Division could seek statewide voter lists and share them with DHS for identifying potentially ineligible voters. ([Department of Justice](#))

By August 2026, Brennan Center reported that courts had rejected the administration's efforts in 21 cases seeking state voter data. ([Brennan Center for Justice](#))

[DOJ — Voter-roll litigation](#)

[DOJ Office of Legal Counsel — Voter-roll data](#)

[Brennan Center — Litigation over voter data](#)

Shared edge

This is an especially important one for your project:

elections ↔ immigration enforcement ↔ DHS databases ↔ DOJ ↔ voter databases.

That is a genuine **cross-domain data coupling**.

12. Civil-rights enforcement has been substantially redirected

DOJ has dismissed or moved to dismiss several Biden-era police-pattern investigations and consent decrees, including Minneapolis and Louisville. ([Department of Justice](#))

It has also dismissed DEI-related lawsuits involving police and firefighters. ([Department of Justice](#))

DOJ eliminated disparate-impact liability from its Title VI regulations in December 2025. ([Department of Justice](#))

[DOJ — Police investigations and consent decrees](#)

[DOJ — DEI-related police/fire litigation](#)

[DOJ — Title VI disparate-impact rule](#)

Damage

The federal government's role changes from:

detect → investigate → litigate → supervise institutional reform

toward a substantially narrower conception of civil-rights enforcement focused on intentional discrimination and particular statutory violations.

13. Federal law enforcement has been reoriented

The administration has explicitly changed DOJ priorities toward violent crime, gangs, immigration, drug enforcement and the death penalty. DOJ has reinstated and expanded federal capital punishment procedures, including additional execution methods and accelerated procedures. ([Department of Justice](#))

The administration also pardoned/commuted large numbers of January 6 defendants. DOJ maintains the official clemency records. ([Department of Justice](#))

[DOJ — Federal death penalty changes](#)

[DOJ — Trump clemency grants](#)

Damage/change

The major institutional change is the shift from:

independent prosecution norms

toward:

presidentially aligned enforcement priorities.

This is particularly important because prosecution is one of the federal government's most coercive powers.

14. The FBI's institutional role and public legitimacy have changed

The administration's "weaponization" framework has explicitly reframed prior FBI investigations as political abuse. DOJ's Weaponization Working Group, for example, has revisited the Richmond FBI investigation of conservative Catholics. ([Department of Justice](#))

At the same time, the FBI continues substantial conventional criminal work; for example, its 2026 Operation Spring Cleaning involved more than 1,100 arrests and nearly 1,000 firearms seized. ([Department of Justice](#))

[DOJ — FBI Richmond investigation review](#)

[DOJ — Operation Spring Cleaning](#)

Why this distinction matters

I would **not** characterize this as "the FBI was simply dismantled."

The more accurate description is:

The FBI's mission has been politically reweighted.

That is a much more important systems observation.

15. The administrative state has lost a major legal source of autonomy

The Supreme Court's 2024 *Loper Bright* decision eliminated Chevron deference and required courts to exercise independent judgment when interpreting statutes administered by agencies. ([Legal Information Institute](#))

That change predates the current administration, but it is a crucial component of the intellectual/legal transformation we have been discussing.

[Supreme Court/LII — Loper Bright](#)

Damage/change

The institutional balance changes from:

Congress → agency expertise → regulated parties

toward greater:

Congress → courts → agency.

Combined with aggressive presidential control of agencies, this creates a potentially powerful double movement:

agency autonomy ↓

while

presidential control ↑

and

judicial control ↑.

That is one of the most important structural changes in the entire system.

16. Presidential control over independent agencies has expanded

In June 2026, the Supreme Court's *Trump v. Slaughter* decision held that the President has authority to remove principal officers of independent agencies such as the FTC. Justice Gorsuch's concurrence explicitly recognized the resulting implication that the President can effectively exercise powers previously delegated to independent agencies. ([Legal Information Institute](#))

[Supreme Court/LII — Trump v. Slaughter](#)

Damage/change

This is potentially a fundamental reconfiguration:

independent agency → presidentially controlled agency.

When combined with *Loper Bright*, it is difficult to overstate the institutional significance.

17. Environmental and climate policy has been substantially reversed

The administration has redirected federal energy and environmental policy toward fossil-fuel production and away from climate mitigation.

One measurable consequence is the cancellation/review of projects funded through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act. GAO found that agencies had cancelled approximately **800 projects worth \$18 billion**, while another roughly **2,500 projects worth \$34 billion** remained undecided. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

EPA has also lost hundreds of employees through early retirement while still administering major environmental programs. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — IIJA and IRA funding changes](#)

[GAO — EPA IRA funding and oversight](#)

Shared edge

**fossil-fuel interests ↔ DOE ↔ EPA ↔ energy infrastructure ↔
data-center electricity demand**

This is particularly relevant to our previous data-center investigation.

18. Federal scientific research has been disrupted

GAO determined that NIH terminated **more than 1,800 grants between February and June 2025**, and NIH obligations were nearly **\$8 billion lower** than during the comparable period in FY2024. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — NIH grants and Impoundment Control Act](#)

This is a major loss of federal research capacity because NIH is not merely a funding agency; it is part of the infrastructure through which biomedical knowledge is produced and coordinated.

Damage

research interruption → laboratory disruption → lost personnel → lost projects → lost data → delayed discoveries.

Some of those costs are effectively irreversible.

19. Public-health infrastructure has been weakened

WHO reports that international health aid was projected to decline **30–40% in 2025 relative to 2023**, with countries reporting reductions in maternal care, vaccination, disease surveillance and emergency preparedness. ([World Health Organization](#))

The WHO reports that U.S. funding cuts specifically disrupted malaria diagnostics, medicines and bed-net supplies. ([World Health Organization](#))

For tuberculosis, WHO says the United States historically supplied roughly half of international donor funding and that the funding disruption puts major programs at risk. ([World Health Organization](#))

[WHO — Global health financing cuts](#)

[WHO — Malaria and U.S. funding cuts](#)

[WHO — TB funding impact](#)

This is simultaneously:

domestic institutional damage + international damage + future pandemic risk.

20. Education Department capacity has been dramatically reduced

The Education Department's workforce fell by more than 45% in the broader federal workforce reduction data. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

Its Office for Civil Rights lost approximately half its staff in March 2025. GAO estimated that paying the salaries and benefits of staff who were no longer working during the resulting period could itself have cost up to **\$38 million**. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

GAO continues to identify improvement of federal student aid and protection of student information as priority problems. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — Education civil-rights workforce reduction](#)

[GAO — Education Department priority recommendations](#)

Damage

The important distinction is that the damage occurs at three levels:

education policy → civil-rights enforcement → student financial aid administration.

21. IRS capacity has been degraded

About **17,000 IRS employees—approximately 17% of the January 2025 workforce—left in 2025** through deferred resignation and early retirement. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

During the 2026 filing season, GAO found that paper returns took longer because IRS lacked staff to update some IT systems, fewer customer-service calls were answered, wait times increased, and millions of refunds were delayed for taxpayers without direct-deposit information. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — 2025 IRS workforce and operations](#)

[GAO — 2026 IRS filing season](#)

This has a particularly important systems consequence:

Reducing tax administration capacity can reduce the state's fiscal capacity even when statutory tax rates remain unchanged.

22. And the IRS has become coupled to immigration enforcement

This is one of the clearest examples of the cross-domain coupling you want to identify.

In September 2026, a federal appeals court ruled that the IRS **unlawfully shared taxpayer information with ICE**, involving approximately **47,000 taxpayer addresses**. The court found that the information-sharing process violated federal tax-privacy law. ([Reuters](#))

[Reuters — Appeals court on IRS/ICE data sharing](#)

This is extremely significant for your model because:

tax system → personal data → immigration enforcement

is an example of a **shared-edge connection between previously distinct governmental domains**.

And it demonstrates why your earlier concern about government databases is not merely theoretical.

23. CFPB has been partially incapacitated

GAO reports that between February and August 2025 the CFPB issued stop-work orders, closed supervisory examinations, terminated employees and contracts, and terminated enforcement cases.

([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — CFPB reorganization](#)

Damage

The CFPB's functions include:

- consumer-finance enforcement;
- complaint handling;
- financial education;
- monitoring financial products for consumer risks.

So the damage is not simply fewer employees.

It is reduced **countervailing power against financial institutions**.

That fits directly into the older Powell/Heritage/corporate-regulatory lineage we have been tracing.

24. SEC capacity and financial-market oversight have been reduced

More than 12% of SEC staff accepted voluntary-departure incentives in FY2025, and GAO found concerns about loss of institutional knowledge. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — SEC workforce reductions](#)

This matters in the context of the financialization of the AI/data-center buildout we discussed earlier.

There is an interesting potential Shared Edge:

AI infrastructure boom ↔ private credit ↔ SPVs ↔ securities markets ↔ SEC oversight.

A reduction in regulatory capacity occurs simultaneously with rapid expansion of a new, highly leveraged infrastructure-financing ecosystem.

I would flag this as an area requiring considerably more investigation.

25. Foreign aid has undergone an extraordinary contraction

This is one of the largest international changes.

USAID's inspector general reports that, as of March 2025, more than **\$76.5 billion of \$159 billion in foreign-assistance awards—almost 50%—had been terminated.** ([Office of Inspector General](#))

The administration subsequently ceased USAID as an independent operating agency; the State Department assumed many of its functions on July 1, 2025. More than 1,000 awards were transferred, about 700 worth **\$45 billion** involving development and humanitarian programs. ([Office of Inspector General](#))

[USAID OIG — Terminated USAID awards](#)

[USAID OIG — Foreign-assistance asset disposition and transfer](#)

Damage

The consequences include:

- humanitarian assistance;
- global health;
- food security;
- democracy programs;
- development programs;

- disaster assistance;
- local institutional capacity;
- U.S. diplomatic influence.

WHO estimates that health-service reductions have already been severe in some countries. ([World Health Organization](#))

26. U.S. soft power and development infrastructure have been damaged

This deserves its own category because the effect isn't reducible to money.

USAID historically provided a network of:

local partners → NGOs → governments → public-health systems → civil-society organizations → U.S. diplomatic relationships.

The rapid termination of programs broke many of those relationships.

USAID OIG found, for example, that the closure of programs in the Philippines meant equipment could often no longer be transferred to another U.S. government agency because USAID operations themselves were being scaled back. ([Office of Inspector General](#))

[USAID OIG — Philippines program terminations](#)

This is a classic **network-damage problem**: the destroyed capability includes relationships that are not easily reconstructed.

27. U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine has been fundamentally reconfigured

The U.S. has moved toward a much more direct emphasis on ending the Ukraine war through negotiation with Russia, while European allies have assumed a much larger share of Ukraine's support.

At the July 2026 NATO summit, European allies and Canada were described as financing the vast majority of Ukraine's security assistance, with NATO allies pledging **€70 billion for 2026**. ([NATO](#))

NATO's PURL mechanism now has European allies funding U.S.-supplied weapons; by June 2026 more than **\$6 billion** had been committed. ([NATO](#))

[NATO — Ankara Summit Declaration](#)

[NATO — Support for Ukraine/PURL](#)

Current U.S. diplomacy is simultaneously attempting to negotiate with Russia while the war continues. ([Reuters](#))

Damage/change

The critical geopolitical change is:

U.S.-led support architecture → more European-led support architecture.

That may ultimately strengthen European strategic autonomy, but it also represents a major change in the post-1945 distribution of Western security responsibility.

28. The Russia–NATO relationship has become more unstable

NATO is simultaneously increasing European defense responsibilities and preparing for possible changes in the U.S. military presence in Europe. A current Pentagon review is considering options involving the approximately **80,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe**. ([Reuters](#))

At the same time, NATO is responding to Russian hybrid operations, including suspected attempts to interfere with undersea infrastructure. ([Reuters](#))

[Reuters — Pentagon review of U.S. forces in Europe](#)

[Reuters — Russian undersea sabotage operation](#)

Systemic consequence

The transatlantic system is shifting from:

U.S. overwhelmingly dominant security provider

toward:

Europe increasingly responsible for its own defense, while the U.S. reassesses its role.

That is a major geopolitical reconfiguration.

29. The Iran war has generated a major new economic and strategic shock

The 2026 war with Iran is perhaps the largest new external shock attributable to the current administration.

The IMF reported that the war effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting about **20 million barrels per day—roughly one-fifth of global consumption.** ([IMF](#))

The IMF estimated that oil prices were about **30% above prewar levels** in June and warned that energy importers and developing countries were particularly vulnerable. ([IMF](#))

By July, the IMF/World Bank/IEA/WTO coordination group reported that the global economy remained resilient but that inflation and growth were being affected. ([World Bank](#))

[IMF — Oil-market impact of the war](#)

[IMF — Global economy and Middle East war](#)

[World Bank/IMF/IEA/WTO — War economic impact](#)

CSIS estimates U.S. war costs at roughly **\$40 billion**, excluding some longer-term costs. ([CSIS](#))

[CSIS — Cost of Operation Epic Fury](#)

And as of today, September 11, oil prices are again above \$100/barrel amid renewed disruption. ([Reuters](#))

Damage

The damage channels are:

**war → oil → transportation → inflation → monetary policy →
household purchasing power → fiscal cost → geopolitical realignment.**

30. The war is also altering the global East–West relationship

Russia and India are currently deepening their strategic relationship while BRICS countries continue to explore mechanisms for reducing dependence on Western financial and economic systems. ([Reuters](#))

That is occurring simultaneously with:

- Russia–China strategic cooperation;
- European strategic autonomy;
- increased Chinese access to Russian energy;
- alternative payment and financial arrangements;
- U.S. pressure on countries trading with Russia.

This doesn't mean "the West has collapsed."

It means the **post-Cold-War assumption of a U.S.-centered global economic system is being weakened.**

And that is exactly the sort of second-order geopolitical damage that may not show up in a federal-agency budget.

31. Public procurement and contracting have been disrupted

DHS reviewed more than 17,000 contracts and terminated **438 contracts**, deobligating \$92 million. DHS claimed \$10.5 billion in potential lifetime savings, but GAO found that most of those savings probably will not materialize because DHS can obtain many of the same services through existing contracts. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — DHS contract terminations](#)

Damage

This is an important counterexample to the "DOGE saved money" narrative.

The organizational effect can be:

**contract cancellation → transition costs → replacement contract →
loss of contractor knowledge → duplicated procurement effort.**

So some apparent savings are actually **transaction-cost transfers**.

32. Federal real-estate management has lost capacity

GSA's Public Buildings Service cut staff by **45%** during its 2025 reorganization. GAO found that the reorganization did not follow leading practices and that agencies had delayed projects because the GSA no longer had enough cost estimators. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — GSA Public Buildings Service reorganization](#)

This is another example where:

organizational downsizing → bottleneck elsewhere.

33. Veterans' services have been put under operational strain

GAO identifies 30 priority recommendations at VA as of 2026, including improving the **quality and timeliness of health care**, modernizing IT and improving acquisition management. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

VA also reduced contracting staff by about 15% between April and November 2025 while undertaking a major procurement reorganization. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — VA priority recommendations](#)

[GAO — VA acquisition reorganization](#)

34. The federal government has reduced its DEI/equal-opportunity infrastructure

DOD abolished or restructured all 41 remaining civilian and military positions whose primary duties involved DEI and disbanded its federal DEI advisory committee. ([Government Accountability Office](#))

[GAO — DOD DEI workforce reductions](#)

This is not merely a symbolic change. These offices previously:

- maintained data;

- provided training;
- supported committees;
- analyzed workforce patterns;
- handled reporting.

So the institutional change is:

data/monitoring → reduced

as well as:

policy preference → reversed.

35. A significant part of the federal government is becoming more directly dependent upon private infrastructure

This is the category I think deserves the most attention in relation to your larger theory.

Government computation, cloud infrastructure and AI are increasingly supplied by private companies.

DOD's Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability uses major commercial cloud providers for highly classified military computing. Oracle is providing AI services in U.S. classified cloud environments. ([Department of Justice](#))

That means:

government function → private computational infrastructure.

This is not inherently illegitimate; much of it is ordinary contracting.

But structurally it creates a new dependency:

The state increasingly requires private computational infrastructure to perform state functions.

That is directly relevant to the Technological Sovereignist hypothesis we developed earlier.

36. Government data is becoming more tightly coupled across formerly separate domains

The voter-roll litigation and IRS/ICE episode are especially revealing.

We now have examples of:

voter records ↔ DHS citizenship records

and

tax records ↔ ICE immigration enforcement.

The DOJ's own OLC memorandum explicitly contemplated sharing state voter lists with DHS. ([Department of Justice](#))

The IRS/ICE information-sharing program was found unlawful by an appeals court. ([Reuters](#))

This is probably one of the most important categories for your model.

The transformation is:

government databases that formerly served separate institutional purposes are being coupled for new purposes.

That's a concrete example of **Shared-Edge Unification at the data layer**.

37. The courts have become a major battlefield for changing the structure of government

You specifically asked about strategic litigation.

There is now extensive litigation by conservative legal organizations such as America First Legal and Alliance Defending Freedom. America First Legal, for example, has litigated against the Judicial Conference itself and intervened in election cases in support of administration policies. ([America First Legal](#))

The RNC is currently involved in approximately 200 election-related legal battles, often funding or strategically supporting litigation without formally appearing as the plaintiff. ([Axios](#))

[America First Legal — Litigation against Judicial Conference](#)

[America First Legal — Election litigation](#)

[Axios — RNC election litigation network](#)

Damage/change

This produces a feedback loop:

ideological organization → test case → favorable lower-court venue → appellate litigation → Supreme Court → precedent → new executive authority → new test case.

That is considerably more sophisticated than ordinary lobbying.

And it is one of the clearest places where your **historical "Powell → Heritage → Project 2025"** lineage intersects with the current institutional transformation.

38. The Supreme Court has altered several important constitutional boundaries

The most important examples include:

Administrative state

Loper Bright eliminated Chevron deference. ([Legal Information Institute](#))

Presidential control

Trump v. Slaughter strengthened presidential removal power over independent agencies. ([Legal Information Institute](#))

Immigration

The Alien Enemies Act litigation has changed the procedural boundaries of expedited removal. ([Supreme Court](#))

Citizenship

The Court decided *Trump v. Barbara* in June 2026, holding that children born in the U.S. to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are citizens under the Citizenship Clause—rejecting the administration's effort to change that rule by executive order. ([Supreme Court](#))

[Supreme Court — Trump v. Barbara](#)

So the court system has not simply "approved everything."

That is important.

The legal system is currently a site of active institutional struggle.

39. The emergency docket itself has become a mechanism of governance

The Supreme Court has increasingly resolved major Trump-administration disputes through emergency applications rather than conventional merits decisions.

Reuters counted 23 Trump-related emergency rulings between January and October 2025, with the administration prevailing in 21. ([Reuters](#))

This does **not** mean those emergency orders are all permanent precedents. That's an important qualification.

But operationally they can determine whether a government action occurs **for months or years before a final merits decision**.

Shared-edge implication

This creates:

executive action → emergency litigation → temporary judicial authorization → implementation → changed institutional reality.

That is a form of **temporal leverage**.

40. The international humanitarian system has been damaged beyond U.S. borders

By 2025–26 the global humanitarian system had suffered a large funding contraction. A 2026 ALNAP assessment reported that **64 million fewer people received humanitarian assistance in 2025**, while aid funding fell about 30% from 2022 to 2025. ([The Guardian](#))

The U.S. contribution is an important part of this story because of the scale of the USAID contraction documented above.

This means that the damage isn't simply:

Americans lose foreign-aid programs.

It is:

the international humanitarian system itself loses one of its principal stabilizing nodes.

That is a textbook example of network damage.

The cross-cutting damage: what is actually happening to the system?

I think the list above reveals something much more interesting than a collection of unrelated policy changes.

There are **five recurring structural mechanisms**.

Mechanism A: Capacity destruction

Workforce reductions

- loss of expertise
- loss of institutional memory
- lower service quality
- greater dependence on contractors/private systems.

Examples:

OPM, FEMA, DOD, NASA, SEC, IRS, EPA, Education, DHS.

[GAO — Federal workforce changes](#)

Mechanism B: Mission substitution

A government organization remains nominally intact but its purpose changes.

Examples:

DOJ

from civil-rights enforcement toward immigration, violent crime and ideological priorities.

DHS

from multiple homeland-security functions toward much greater immigration enforcement.

Education

from broad education/civil-rights functions toward a much smaller role.

EPA


from climate/environmental expansion toward deregulation and energy production.

Mechanism C: Coupling of previously separate government systems

This is, I think, the most directly relevant to Shared-Edge Unification.


Examples:

Voter rolls




and:

Tax records




and:

Government data



and:

Federal land / power



The edges are **data, computation, money and personnel**.

Mechanism D: Privatization of governmental capability

The pattern is not necessarily:

Government disappears.

It is:

Government capability migrates into public-private networks.

Examples include:

cloud computing

AI

data centers

private detention

private contractors

private credit financing

private security

private legal organizations

private platforms


This is where your Technological Sovereigntist hypothesis becomes particularly interesting.

Mechanism E: Organizational coupling through shared ideology

This is the political version of Shared-Edge Unification.


For example:

Corporate deregulation



Separately:

Christian nationalism



Separately:

Tech capital



└─→ political donations
└─→ AI infrastructure
└─→ social platforms
└─→ political personnel

And:

Crypto

|
└─→ financial infrastructure
└─→ political money
└─→ deregulatory policy

The system-level effect doesn't require these actors to agree.

They only need to have **compatible edges**.

A preliminary "damage topology"

I think your mitigation project will benefit from distinguishing **five kinds of damage** rather than treating everything as one phenomenon:

Damage type	Example	Reversibility
Capacity loss	FEMA staffing	Relatively high

Knowledge loss	Experienced federal personnel	Low
Institutional coupling	IRS → ICE data sharing	Medium
Legal/constitutional change	Presidential removal authority	Low
Network destruction	USAID international relationships	Very low
Physical/social consequences	Deportation, deaths, infrastructure damage	Often irreversible
International realignment	European strategic autonomy	Very low
Private substitution	Government → commercial cloud	Potentially difficult to reverse

That distinction could become very useful for remediation.

The most important Shared-Edge connections I would investigate next

If the purpose is **mitigation rather than threat assessment**, I would prioritize the following edges:

1. Workforce reduction ↔ private contracting

Does reducing federal expertise systematically increase the government's dependence on private organizations?

2. Immigration enforcement ↔ government databases

Especially:

IRS ↔ ICE

SSA ↔ DHS/ICE

voter rolls ↔ DHS

citizenship databases ↔ elections

This is already visibly happening.

3. Data centers ↔ government computation

Which private data centers are actually contracted for:

DoD / intelligence / DHS / federal civilian agencies?

This could test our earlier Technological Sovereigntist hypothesis empirically.

4. Political organizations ↔ litigation

Which organizations generate the legal cases that ultimately change constitutional/administrative doctrine?

5. Think tanks ↔ personnel

Who moves from:

Heritage / America First Policy Institute / AFL / other organizations

into government?

This is potentially a much stronger coupling mechanism than lobbying.

6. Private capital ↔ government infrastructure

Especially:

data centers + energy + private credit + government contracts.

7. Foreign-aid dismantling ↔ geopolitical vacuum

Where have U.S. withdrawals created opportunities for:

China / Russia / Gulf states / Turkey / regional powers / private organizations?

8. Federal capacity reduction ↔ state/local governments

Who has inherited the functions that Washington stopped performing?

That question could reveal **new emergent power centers**.

And one particularly important conclusion for your remediation strategy

I think your instinct to focus on **low-order organizational bonds** is promising.

The damage does not appear to depend upon a single giant command structure.

Instead, we see many small couplings:

donor ↔ politician

think tank ↔ personnel

law firm ↔ lawsuit

court ↔ precedent

database ↔ agency

agency ↔ contractor

contractor ↔ private capital

private capital ↔ infrastructure

platform ↔ audience

government ↔ data center

Each individual bond can look innocuous.

But the aggregate network can produce capabilities that **none of the participating organizations possesses independently.**

That is almost exactly your starling-flock analogy.

And it suggests a potentially powerful remediation principle:

Don't necessarily try to defeat the emergent system at its highest-order node. Identify the small number of low-order shared edges whose removal or weakening causes multiple higher-order capabilities to disintegrate.

In other words, your remediation target may not be:

"stop Organization X."

It may be:

"break the coupling between X and Y."

For example, if a future investigation showed that a particular capability depends on:

political organization → government database → private analytics → law-enforcement action,

then breaking **any one of those edges** might be considerably easier than defeating the whole network.

That is where I think your **Shared-Edge Unification model** could move from **descriptive political theory to an actual intervention methodology**.

And the evidence above gives us a first, fairly large **damage topology** against which to test it.

Q7: Thank you. Now please give me a text list of URLs of all the links you provided.

A7: Here is the complete deduplicated list of the **65 URLs** contained in the damage-assessment document you provided. I have preserved the URLs as they appeared in that document, including the **utm_source=chatgpt.com** parameters.

https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108583?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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https://www.hrw.org/report/2026/06/25/dying-in-detention/rising-deaths-in-an-expanding-us-immigration-detention-system?utm_source=chatgpt.com
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https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-federal-government-undermining-election-security?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trump-administration-losing-its-fight-take-over-elections?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-department-justices-civil-rights-division-dismisses-biden-era-police-investigations-and?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-pam-bondi-dismisses-dei-lawsuits-involving-police-officers-and-firefighters?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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https://www.who.int/teams/global-programme-on-tuberculosis-and-lung-health/tb-reports/global-tuberculosis-report-2025/featured-topics/Impact-of-2025-funding-cuts?utm_source=chatgpt.com

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One caveat: the first Supreme Court URL in the source document contains an escaped `\&` before the tracking parameter. I have reproduced it literally above rather than silently altering the source.

The URLs themselves are taken from the uploaded document you supplied.